EU-China cultural diplomacy: room for improvement in troubled times?

Comparing Chinese and EU cultural diplomacy systems

The 2019 strategy document “EU-China – A strategic outlook”, describes the Asian giant as a partner, a competitor, and a rival, and all three labels are applicable to the different aspects of the cultural relations between the two. Although the EU has produced several reports on China, including a 2012 Commission-EEAS Expert group and the 2014 Parliament Preparatory Action leading to the 2016 Joint Communication, these did not result in the adoption of a specific strategy on cultural relations with China, as advised by the 2019 Council conclusions.  

On the ground, European cultural action is significantly impaired by the limited budget for culture: the only available funding comes under the public diplomacy line of the Partnership Instrument, and the EU Delegation in Beijing was stripped off its cultural focal point [2]. Moreover, EUNIC’s actorness is hindered by the Chinese government’s refusal to consider it an official counterpart [3], despite the publication of the 2011 Europe-China cultural compass. Additional challenges stem from the lack of awareness of the EU among Chinese citizens, their growing negative public opinion towards the rest and increasing nationalism.

China’s approach to culture in external relations, called Cultural Soft Power, differs substantially from the European one: it is pragmatic, relies on the state, and thus is often perceived as a propaganda tool by other states. 

Even though the ancient Chinese civilisation is particularly attractive to Europeans for its exoticism and thus contributes to the position of “cultural juggernaut” in Soft Power rankings, China opts for projecting a simplified and standardised image over its actual diversity [4]. Chinese policy papers depict culture as both a differentiator from the EU and an area of cooperation.   

The principal actors of the Chinese Cultural Diplomacy are the Confucius Institutes, one in Brussels being specifically designated to the European Union. However, following a massive outcry, a damage control led to Hanban being rebranded as Centre for Language Education and Cooperation. Far less known (and impactful) are the China Cultural Centres Abroad – only 36 while Confucius Institutes surpass 500. The fact that Chinese embassies in Member States have a Culture and Education department gives it an edge over the European Union whose sole Delegation in Beijing is incapable of reaching out to the 1.4 billion population.

Mitigating differences, seizing opportunities: the way forward

In the midst of COVID-19 induced border closures and deteriorating mutual perceptions [5], re-establishing trust between the EU and China is a prerequisite for stabilising their relations and negotiating the way forward, and the upcoming virtual summit on the 1st of April is a promising development after several delays. To reach the necessary level of convergence, it is imperative to reclaim the place of culture at the heart of Sino-European engagement through:

• Learning about and from each other: abandoning age-old rhetoric in favour of actively listening to the other part and replicating its strengths, cooperating with local partners (see the newly-launched European Space of Culture), and developing language and intercultural skills both among the general public and diplomats (by establishing a EU-China Culture Year and expanding Erasmus+ opportunities);

• Developing a country-specific EU strategy on cultural relations with China: putting away competition among EU Member States themselves and recognising the strategic importance of the “Middle State” would result in increased funding opportunities and common actions coordinated by the EU Delegation and the EUNIC clusters, allowing for increased credibility and sustainability of the projects;

• Signing a cultural cooperation framework: be it as an annex to the CAI or as a separate legal document with the purpose of promoting cultural diversity and specific joint projects, capitalising on the previous mapping and research phase; and

• Strengthening the use of digital tools: to reach citizens beyond Beijing and Brussels in an interactive way (for instance, exploring the Team Europe approach of the EU Global Gateway), while also boosting the potential for peer-to-peer exchanges and fair business-to-business cooperation rather than competition (in line with the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act).

Ultimately, for the EU-China cooperation to be effective in the long run, it should entail dealing with values in an open and respectful manner, by grounding their relations on the “united in diversity” principle [6] and embracing differences as a source of creative inspiration for a mutually beneficial guanxi.